Machine learning approach for detection of nonTor traffic by Hodo, Elike et al.
Machine learning approach for detection 
of nonTor traffic
Elike Hodo, Xavier Bellekens, Ephraim Iorkyase, Andrew 
Hamilton, Christos Tachtatzis and Robert Atkinson
© the authors / ACM 2017. This is the author's version of 
the work. It is posted here for your personal use. Not for 
redistribution. The definitive Version of Record was 
published in Proceedings of the 12th International 
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security,
https://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3098954.3106068
Machine Learning Approach for Detection of nonTor Traffic  
 
Elike Hodo 
University of Strathclyde 
Scotland 
elike.hodo@strath.ac.uk 
Xavier Bellekens 
University of Abertay Dundee 
Scotland 
x.bellekens@abertay.ac.uk 
Ephraim Iorkyase 
University of Strathclyde 
Scotland 
Ephraim.iorkyase@strath.ac.uk 
Andrew Hamilton 
University of Strathclyde 
Scotland 
Andrew.w.hamilton@strath.ac.uk 
Christos Tachtatzis 
University of Strathclyde 
Scotland 
Christos.tachtatzis@strath.ac.uk 
Robert Atkinson 
University of Strathclyde 
Scotland 
Robert.atkinson@strath.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
Intrusion detection has attracted a considerable interest from 
researchers and industries. After many years of research the 
community still faces the problem of building reliable and 
efficient intrusion detection systems (IDS) capable of handling 
large quantities of data with changing patterns in real time 
situations. The Tor network is popular in providing privacy and 
security to end user by anonymising the identity of internet users 
connecting through a series of tunnels and nodes. This work 
focuses on the classification of Tor traffic and nonTor traffic to 
expose the activities within Tor traffic that minimizes the 
protection of users. A study to compare the reliability and 
efficiency of Artificial Neural Network and Support vector 
machine in detecting nonTor traffic in UNB-CIC Tor Network 
Traffic dataset is presented in this paper. The results are analysed 
based on the overall accuracy, detection rate and false positive 
rate of the two algorithms. Experimental results show that both 
algorithms could detect nonTor traffic in the dataset. A hybrid 
Artificial neural network proved a better classifier than SVM in 
detecting nonTor traffic in UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic 
dataset.  
KEYWORDS 
Artificial neural network, support vector machines, intrusion 
detection systems, Tor and nonTor, UNB-CIC Tor Network 
Traffic dataset. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The computing world has changed over the past decade due to the 
rapid development of internet and new privacy enhancement 
technologies to circumvent internet censorship. Tor which is 
popular in fighting internet censorship has been deployed to serve 
thousands of users transferring terabytes of data daily [1], [2]. 
Tor is an overlay network designed to provide privacy and 
anonymity over the internet for TCP based applications like 
browsing. It operates by anonymising the identity of users 
connecting through a series of tunnels and nodes. A user browses 
the web firstly by sending a request anonymously to Tor routers 
from one of the directory servers [2], [3]. Once a connection is 
established, traffic is relayed to the first router also called the 
Entry Guard. A session key is then generated between the client 
and the Entry Guard using Deffie-Hellman key exchange [4]. The 
same process is repeated on one router (hop) at a time to extend 
the circuit each time with established session keys for the previous 
routers. The last hop called the exit router communicates direct 
with the destination as a proxy [1]. With the establishment of 
three routers, the circuit is ready for internet traffic. The design of 
TOR network which includes the use of three hops and session 
keys helps to maintain anonymity through a concept called 
‘perfect forward secrecy’[2], [5]. 
Tor networks are created to give internet users their privacy, 
freedom of speech, illegal tapping traffic and surveillance of 
network threatening users’ personal identity [6]. Besides Tor 
network being used for good, greater portion of its traffic are port 
scans, hacking attempts, exfiltration of stolen data and online 
criminality [2]. 
Over the last decade, Tor traffic classification has advanced in its 
applications in systems like quality of service (QoS) tools or 
Security information and Event management (SIEM) [7]. A 
considerable interest have been attracted from researchers and the 
industries to the study of these technologies and developing 
classification techniques [8][7]. 
To this effect intrusion detection system (IDS) plays an important 
role in Tor networks. Intrusion Detection Systems are placed on 
the networks to monitor and detect anomalies. In general IDS can 
be categorised into two components, based on the detection 
technique. Signature based and Outlier based IDS. Most IDs 
employ a signature based detection approach where the network 
traffic is monitored and compared against database rules or 
signature of known anomaly in network traffic [9][10]. An alarm 
is raised on detection of a mismatch. Signature based is the most 
ARES’17, August 2017, Regio Callabria, ITALY E. Hodo et al. 
 
2 
 
common as they do not necessarily have to learn the network 
traffic’s behaviour. Although it is effective in detecting known 
anomalies, it cannot detect unknown anomalies unless the 
signature and rules are updated with new signatures [11][12]. 
Signature based is known to have a significant time lapse between 
anomaly detection and activation of its corresponding signature 
[10]. Signature based techniques are mainly human-dependent in 
creating, testing and deploying signatures. 
 The outlier technique is a behavioural based detection system. It 
observes changes in normal activity of network traffic and builds 
a profile of the network traffic being monitored [13][14]. An 
alarm is raised whenever a deviation from the normal behaviour is 
detected. It has the ability to detect unknown anomalies. However 
outlier detection based IDS have the disadvantage of being 
computational expensive because the profile generated over a 
period needs to be updated against each system activity [15] [10]. 
Machine learning techniques have the ability to learn the normal 
and anomalous patterns automatically by training a dataset to 
predict an anomaly in network traffic. One important 
characteristic defining the effectiveness of machine learning 
techniques is the features extracted from raw data for 
classification and detection. Features are the important 
information extracted from raw data. The underlying factor in 
selecting the best features lies in a trade-off between detection 
accuracy and false alarm rates. The use of all features on the other 
hand will lead to a significant overhead and thus reducing the risk 
of removing important features. Although the importance of 
feature selection cannot be overlooked, intuitive understanding of 
the problem is mostly used in the selection of features [16].  
This paper analyses the performance of Artificial neural network 
(ANN) and Support vector machines (SVM)  in terms of overall 
accuracy in detecting nonTor traffic in a Tor network traffic 
dataset data from the University of New Brunswick (UNB), 
Canadian Institute for cyber security (CIC) using a hybrid 
anomaly based approach. As part of the work, the results are 
compared with the results of A.Lashkari et al.[7]  being the only 
study published to the best of our knowledge using the UNB-CIC 
Tor Network Traffic dataset [17]. A. Lashkari et al.[7]extracted 23 
time based features from the dataset. A combination algorithm 
Cfs-SubsetEval + BestFirst (SE+BF) and Infogain+Ranker 
(IG+RK) was used to reduce the number of features from 23 to 5. 
The results from the feature selection algorithm was used to test 
different machine learning algorithms (ZeroR, C4.5 and KNN) 
using 10 fold cross validation and measured the weighted average 
precision and recall. Their results showed C4.5 was the best 
classifier. 
In the proposed approach 10 features are selected out of the 28 
features of the dataset using Correlation based feature selection 
(CFS) for training and testing the detection algorithms. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes 
intrusion detection systems, section 3 describes the UNB-CIC Tor 
Network Traffic dataset, section 4  introduces  Artificial neural 
network and Support vector machines algorithms used in the 
experiment respectively, section 5 analysis experimental results, 
conclusion and future works are presented in section VI.  
2 INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
Intrusion detection system is a software application or a device 
placed at strategic places on a network to monitor and detect 
anomalies in network traffic [1][2] as shown in Fig. 1. The main 
features of IDS are to raise an alarm when an anomaly is detected. 
A complementary approach is to take corrective measures when 
anomalies are detected, such an approach is referred to as an 
intrusion Prevention System (IPS) [3]. Based on the interactivity 
property of IDS, it can be designed to work either on-line or off-
line. On-line IDS operates on a network in real time by analysing 
traffic packets and applying rules to classify normal and 
analogous traffic. Off-line IDS operates by storing data and after 
processing to classify normal and anomaly.  
 
Figure 1.  Intrusion Detection System model. 
3 UNB-CIC TOR NETWORK TRAFFIC 
DATASET  
UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic dataset [17] is a representative 
dataset of real-world traffic defined as a set of task. Three users 
were set up for browser traffic collection and two users for the 
communication parts such as chat, mail, p2p etc. from more than 
18 representative applications such as Facebook, skype, Spotify, 
Gmail etc. The dataset contains 8 types of Tor traffic as shown in 
table 1 and non-Tor traffic. 
3.1 UNB-CIC Tor network Traffic dataset 
description 
Table 1: Description of UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic  
Type of Traffic Description 
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Browsing 
 
 
 
Email 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audio-Streaming 
 
 
 
 
 
Video-Streaming 
 
 
 
 
 
 
File Transfer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voice over Internet Protocol 
(Voip 
 
 
HTTP and HTTPS traffic 
generated by users while using 
Firefox and chrome 
 
Traffic samples generated using 
a Thunderbird client and two 
other accounts holders. Mails 
were delivered through SMTP/S 
and received using POP3/SSL 
in client 1 and IMAP/SSL in 
client 2. 
 
Instant messaging applications 
were identified under the chat 
label. The label was associated 
with Facebook and hangouts 
through web browser, skype and 
IAM and ICQ using an 
application called pidgin. 
 
Traffic was captured from 
Spotify identifying audio 
applications that require a 
continuous and steady stream of 
data. 
 
Traffic was captured from 
YouTube and Vimeo services 
using Chrome and Firefox 
identifying video applications 
that require a continuous and 
steady stream of data. 
 
This traffic was generated from 
skype file transfers, FTP over 
SSH (SFTP) and FTP over SSL 
(FTPS) traffic sessions 
identifying the traffic 
applications sending or 
receiving file documents. 
 
This is the traffic generated by 
voice applications using 
Facebook, Hangouts and Skype. 
 
 
Table 2: Description of captured features  
Feature Name Feature description 
Source IP 
Source Port 
Destination IP 
Destination Port 
Protocol 
Flow Duration 
Flow Bytes/s 
Flow Packets/s 
Flow IAT Mean 
Flow IAT Std 
 
Flow IAT Max 
Flow IAT Min 
Fwd IAT Mean 
 
 
Fwd IAT Std 
 
 
Fwd IAT Max 
 
 
Fwd IAT Min 
 
 
Bwd IAT Mean 
 
 
Bwd IAT Std 
 
 
Bwd IAT Max 
 
 
Bwd IAT Min 
 
Active Mean 
 
Active Std 
 
Active Max 
 
Active Min 
 
Idle Mean 
 
Idle Std 
 
Idle Max 
 
Idle Min 
IP address sending packets to destination 
Port sending packets from source 
IP address receiving packets from source 
Port receiving packets 
Type of the protocol used 
Length of connection in seconds 
Number of data bytes 
Number of data packets 
Packets flow inter arrival time Mean 
Packets flow inter arrival time  
Standard deviation 
Packets flow inter arrival time Max. 
Packets flow inter arrival time Min. 
Forward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets Sent forward 
direction Mean. 
Forward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent forward 
direction Standard deviation. 
Forward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent forward 
direction Max. 
Forward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent forward 
direction Min. 
Backward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent backward 
Mean. 
Backward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent backward 
Standard deviation. 
Backward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent backward Max. 
Backward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent backward Min. 
The amount of time a flow was active 
before becoming idle mean. 
The amount of time a flow was active 
before becoming idle Standard deviation. 
The amount of time a flow was active 
before becoming idle Max. 
The amount of time a flow was active 
before becoming idle Min. 
The amount of time a flow was idle 
before becoming active Mean. 
The amount of time a flow was idle 
before becoming active Std deviation. 
The amount of time a flow was idle 
before becoming active Max. 
The amount of time a flow was idle 
before becoming active Min. 
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The non-Tor traffic captured in the dataset contains unique 
characteristics differentiating it from the Tor traffic. These 
characteristics are called features. The UNB-CIC Tor Network 
Traffic dataset contains a total of 28 features listed in table  2. 
The features were generated by a sequence of packets having the 
same values for {source IP, source Port, destination port and 
protocol (TCP and UDP)}. All Tor traffic was TCP since the flow 
does not support UDP. The generation of flows was done by a 
new application, the ISCX Flow Meter which generates 
bidirectional flows [7]. 
4 DETECTION ALGORITHMS  
4.1 Artificial Neural Network 
Artificial neural network (ANN) consists of information 
processing elements known to mimic neurons of the brain. 
In this experiment, the neural network which is a Multilayer 
perceptron (MLP) is provided with a set labelled training set 
which learns a mapping from  input features listed in table II  
represented as 𝑥 in Fig. 2 to outputs (Tor and NonTor) as 𝑦 in Fig. 
2 given a labelled set of inputs-output pairs 𝑑 = {(𝑥', 𝑦')}'+1,                 
(1) 
Where, 𝑑 is called the training set and 𝑁 is the number of training 
examples. It is assumed that 𝑦' is a categorical variable from some 
infinite set, 𝑦' ∈ {1…𝐶} [4]. The technique used to train the MLP 
neural network is the Back Propagation hence the name MLP-BP.  
 
Figure 2: Artificial Neural Network Model used in 
experiment. 
The construction of the MLP-BP neural network is by putting 
layers of non-linear elements to form complex hypotheses. Each 
node takes an element of a feature vector. The structure of the 
ANN consists of three layers feed-forward neural network as 
shown in Fig. 2 Nodes labelled 𝑥2 ……𝑥3  have been used to 
represent the input feature vectors to the ANN.  
Hidden inner nodes 𝑎2 ……𝑎3 make up the hidden layer with an 
output layer of 𝑦2	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑦7 nodes denoting different output classes 
(Tor and NonTor). The interconnection between the nodes is 
associated with scalar weights with an initial weight assigned to 
the connection. During training, the weights are adjusted. 
Evaluating the hypotheses is done by setting the input modes in a 
feed-back process and the values are propagated through the 
network to the output. At this stage the gradient descent is used so 
as to push the error in the output node back through the network 
by a back propagation process in order to estimate the error in the 
hidden nodes. The gradient of the cost – function is then 
calculated [5]. 
4.2  Support Vector Machines 
Support Vector Machines (SVM) is a machine learning algorithm 
that learns to classify data using points labelled training examples 
falling into one or two classes. The SVM algorithm builds a 
model that can predict if a new example falls into one category or 
the other [6]. The model is constructed by constructing 𝑘 Models 
of SVM, where 𝑘   denotes the number of classes (Tor and 
NonTor). 𝑥2	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑦7 SVM represented as 𝑙th SVM is trained with 
all the examples in the 𝑙th class labelled 1 and the other labelled 0.  
Where,𝑥' ∈ 𝑅; , 𝑦' ∈ {1,0}  , 𝑖 = 1… . . 𝑁  and 𝑦' ∈ {1……𝑘}  is a 
class of 𝑥' . Introducing a slack of positive variables 	𝜉' , that 
measures the extent of constraint in a non-linear situation. The 
prima Optimisation problem becomes [7]: 
 
x lll bw ,,
min     27	(𝑤A)B𝑤A + ∁ å
=
N
i
l
i
1
x    
       
    (𝑤A)Bf (𝑥)' + 𝑏A ≥ 1 − 𝜉'	A ,				𝑖𝑓	𝑦' = 𝑁, 
                            (2) 
    (𝑤A)Bf (𝑥)' + 𝑏A ≤ −1 + 𝜉'A, 𝑖𝑓	𝑦' = 𝑁, 
    𝜉'A ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1……𝑁, 
Where the training set 𝑥'  are mapped into higher dimensional 
space by the function f  and ∁ , where ∁  is a parameter which 
trades off wide margin with small number of margin failures . 
Minimisation of   27 (𝑤A)B𝑤A implies maximising  7JK  , which is 
the margin between the two data points. The SVM then searches 
for a balance between the regularisation term 27 (𝑤A)B𝑤A and the 
errors in training the dataset. Solving (2) gives 𝑘  decision 
functions: 𝑤 2Bf 𝑥 + 𝑏2			 
     ⋮                                                     (3) 
                                   			 𝑤 MBf 𝑥 + 𝑏M       
   
where 𝑥  is the class having the largest value of the decision 
function: 𝑥 ≡ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥A≡2…M( 𝑤A Bf 𝑥 + 𝑏A)           
(4) 
The dual problem of (2) having the same number of variables as 
the number of data in (2). Thus 𝑘		𝑁 -variable quadratic 
programing problems are solved. 
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5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ANALYSIS 
5.1 Results Evaluation Metrics 
The effectiveness of IDS requires high accuracy, high detection 
rate (Recall) and high Positive Predictive value (Precision) as well 
as low false positive rate. The performance of IDS in general is 
evaluated in terms of overall accuracy, detection rate and false 
positive rate.  
Accuracy (ACC)= BRBRSB,STRST, 
Detection Rate (DR)= BRBRSTR 
False Positive rate (FPR)= TRTRSB, 
Positive Predictive Value (PPV)= 	 BRBRSTR 
Where, True Negative (TN): a measure of the number of normal 
events rightly classified normal. 
True Positive (TP): a measure of attacks classified rightly as 
attack. 
False Positive (FP): a measure of normal events misclassified as 
attacks. 
False Negative (FN): a measure of attacks misclassified as 
normal. 
 
5.2 Feature Selection Algorithm 
This paper proposes correlation based feature selection (CFS) to 
select the relevant features out of the 28 features.  
CFS is a filtering algorithm using a correlation based heuristic 
evaluation function to rank feature subsets. A good set of features 
are highly correlated with the class (target) and at the same time 
uncorrelated to each other. Redundant features are ignored 
because they have low correlation with class and will turn to 
highly correlated with one or more of the remaining features. A 
feature is accepted based on the extent it predicts classes in areas 
of the instance space which has not been predicted by other 
features. 
Equation (8) shows the CFS feature subset evaluation function. 𝑀V = MWXYMSM MZ2 WYY                                                                       (5) 
Where 𝑀V  is heuristic “merit” of a feature subset 𝑠 containing 𝑘 
features, 𝑟\]  is the average feature class correlation. The 
numerator can be thought of as giving an indication of how 
predictive a group of features are; the denominator of how much 
redundancy there is among the features [8]. 
The CFS algorithm reduces the dimensionality of the dataset, 
reduces overfitting and gives a shorter training time.  Table IV 
shows the 10 selected features based on the appropriate 
correlation measure and heuristic search strategy. The selected 
features are: destination Port, Bwd IAT Mean, Idle Max., Fwd 
IAT Min., Source Port, idel Min., Flow Bytes/s, Flow IAT Std., 
Source IP, Destination IP. 
 
 
5.3 Experimental Results 
Neural network and Support vector machine classification 
involves two phases: the classification phase and training phase as 
shown in Fig. 3. In the training phase, the algorithm learns the 
distribution of the features with corresponding classes. During the 
classification phase, the learned model is applied to a test set 
which has not been previously seen by the training phase. 
 
 
Figure 3: Experimental Model. 
In this work, experiment was performed by training ANN and 
SVM with UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic dataset to detect 
nonTor Traffic. 
In the first set of experiment, ANN was trained with all 28 
features of the dataset with 20-hidden neurons and with 10 
features selected using CFS with 6-hidden nodes. The ANN uses 
Levenberg-Marquardt training function (trainlm) for learning. 
In the second set of the experiment SVM was trained with all 28 
features in the dataset and with 10 features selected using CFS. 
The performance of ANN and SVM was evaluated on train (70%) 
dataset, test (15%) dataset and validation 20% dataset.  
Fig. 4 shows the results after training ANN and SVM with all 28 
features and 10 features selected by CFS. A.Lashkari et al.[9] 
Proposed C 4.5 in classifying Tor Traffic and nonTor Traffic 
using only the time based features of the dataset.  
 
Figure 4: Experimental Results of ANN, SVM, CFS-ANN and 
CFS-SVM. . 
The experimental results as compared to the results in [7] show 
CFS-ANN performs with an overall accuracy of 99.8% in the 
ARES’17, August 2017, Regio Callabria, ITALY E. Hodo et al. 
 
6 
 
classification of Tor and nonTor using only 10 features in the 
dataset. On the other hand the DR for Tor and nonTor Traffic in 
CFS-ANN recorded 98.9% and 100% respectively which 
performed better than C 4.5. The best values in detection 
accuracy, detection rate with a low false positive rate in the 
classification of Tor and nonTor traffic were recorded by CFS-
ANN making it a promising detection system for nonTor traffic. 
A comparison of experimental results with results from [7] are 
shown in table 3. 
Table 3: Experimental results compared to A.Lashkari et 
al.[7] 
PERFORMANCE ANN CFS-
ANN 
SVM CFS-
SVM 
C4.5 
[7] 
      
DR (Tor) % 93.7 98.8 67 98.4 93.4 
FPR (Tor) % 0.21 0.03 2.3 1.8 - 
PPV (Tor) % 98.3 99.8 79 80 94.8 
DR (nonTor) % 99.2 100 98 99 99.2 
FPR (nonTor) % 1.6 1.2 32.8 2.6 - 
PPV(nonTor) % 99.8 99.8 96 88 99.4 
Overall ACC. % 99.1 99.8 94 88.1 - 
6   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents experimental study using two algorithms to 
detect nonTor traffic in UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic dataset. 
The research mainly focuses on detecting nonTor traffic in a 
representative dataset of real-world traffic to expose the activities 
within the Tor-traffic that downgrades the privacy of users. The 
work proposes CFS-ANN hybrid classifier in the detection of 
nonTor traffic in UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic dataset. 
Experimental results show the proposed algorithm detects nonTor 
with an accuracy of 99.8%, detection rate of 100% and false 
positive rate of 1.2%. The proposed algorithm performed better 
than SVM and C4.5 proposed in [7] as shown in table 4. The 
proposed hybrid classifier reduces the dimensionality of the data 
size by 65% removing the less effective features thereby lowering 
computational cost and training time.  
In the future, the performance of the proposed algorithm and deep 
neural networks will be analysed in the classification of the 8 
different types of traffic in the UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic 
dataset. 
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